I. Introduction
Following Lucas ' (1972) pathbreaking work, economists have sought to explain business cycle fluctuations in output and employment using general equilibrium models featuring optimizing agents with rational expectations. Hall (1975) criticizes this approach, noting that while models such as Lucas' can account for the existence of a Phillips curve relationship between innovations in the nominal money supply or the nominal price level on the one hand and innovations in real output or employment on the other, they fail to explain why movements in output and employment appear to be serially correlated over the business cycle. Modigliani (1977) , Tobin (1977) , and 1 Gordon (1981) all echo Hall's criticism.
In response to this repeated criticism, much subsequent work in business cycle theory has augmented Lucas' original model with additional mechanisms that allow monetary shocks to have persistent effects on output. Lucas (1975) himself introduces physical capital accumulation as a propagation mechanism, while Taylor (1980) considers staggered nominal wage contracts. Blanchard (1983) considers staggered nominal price setting; Blinder and Fischer (1981) consider inventory accumulation; Sargent (1987, Ch.18 ) considers adjustment costs in the labor market; and both Wright (1986) and Howitt (1988) consider labor market search. This paper explores yet another channel through which monetary shocks can have persistent effects on output and employment: the customer flow dynamics originally modeled by Phelps and Winter (1970) . Bils (1989) presents a partial equilibrium model of customer flow dynamics, in which a single monopolist supplies output to a set of customers who arrive in an infinite sequence of overlapping generations. Prior to actually buying the firm's output, each customer is unsure of how well the good will suit his tastes. Thus, a customer who does purchase the good in his first period of life and finds it to his liking develops an attachment to the firm. In this case, he becomes willing to pay a higher price for the good in his second period of life. Thus, in Bils' model as in Phelps and Winter's, the firm faces a trade-off: it can raise its price and thereby extract more surplus from its existing customers, or it can lower its price and thereby attract more new customers.
Bils demonstrates that these customer flow dynamics induce the monopolist to charge a markup of price over marginal cost that varies 2 countercyclically.
In some periods, high demand results from an especially large inflow of newly-born customers. It is precisely during these periods that the firm finds it most rewarding to lower its price to expand the size of its customer base. Hence, periods of high demand coincide with periods of low prices and, since marginal costs are constant, low markups as well. These countercyclical markups imply that market clearing prices work in Bils' model to amplify, rather than stabilize, movements in output relative to demand. This paper begins by modifying and extending Bils' analysis so that it takes place in a general equilibrium setting where all agents are infinitelylived. The model developed here pairs each household with one of a large number of firms as its initial supplier of consumption goods and confronts the representative household with a fixed cost of searching for a new supplier.
This search cost gives the representative firm some monopoly power, enabling it to raise its price above those of all other firms while still retaining some of its customers.
In the simplest version of the model, considered in sections II and III, disturbances to the marginal product of labor drive fluctuations in aggregate output and employment. When output increases after a positive technology shock, so does the size of each household's purchase of consumption goods.
This increase in the size of each purchase strengthens the representative household's incentive to search for a new supplier. Consequently, the representative firm's monopoly power erodes during periods of high output, decreasing the equilibrium markup of price over marginal cost. Again, countercyclical markups work to amplify the effects of real shocks on aggregate output.
Section IV then augments the model to account for persistence in the effects of technology shocks. There, households acquire new information through the process of search today that lowers their costs of search tomorrow. As before, an increase in output yields an increase in the number of searching households. In this case, however, the increase in the number of searching households today also increases the number of households with low search costs tomorrow, leading to an increase in the number of searching households tomorrow, and so on. Thus, even following a purely transitory technology shock, the representative firm's monopoly power erodes for a number of periods. Movements in price relative to marginal cost not only amplify movements in output during the period of the shock, but also serve to generate persistent movements in output during the periods following the shock.
Section V introduces a nominal sector and shows how the customer flow dynamics that both amplify and propagate the effects of technology shocks also allow the effects of monetary shocks to persist. Section VI concludes.
II. Customer Flow Dynamics

A. The Economic Environment
The economy consists of a continuum of firms indexed by ie If household j decides to leave its initial supplier during period t, it must pay a fixed search cost k, measured in terms of utility; since the household's utility function is linear in labor supply, k may be interpreted as a time cost. Through the process of search, the household is matched randomly with one of the other firms, which becomes its second supplier during period t. The probability that a searching household gets firm i as a second supplier is proportional to x , the size of the firm's initial customer base.
it More precisely, the probability that a household will have a second supplier with index i<I during period t is given by forward while all other firms charge prices p . This behavior--and, in particular, its effects on the firm's profits--will then be used to characterize the conditions under which the firm has no incentive to deviate 0 from a candidate equilibrium price sequence p .
B. Household Optimization
Consider a representative household whose initial supplier during period t t plans to charge prices given by the sequence q . If all other firms charge t prices p , the household's knowledge of the distribution of the other firms'
prices allows it to know with certainty that if it leaves its initial t supplier, it will be matched with a second supplier charging p .
t Let u(q ;q ) denote the maximized value of the household's expected jt utility from period t forward, given that it experiences shock q during jt t period t and its initial supplier plans to charge prices q from period t t forward. Then u(q ;q ) must satisfy the Bellman equation
where the expectation is taken over realizations of q with its initial supplier, choosing s=0, if and only if
Next, consider the behavior of a representative firm that begins period t with a set of initial customers of measure x . If this firm charges prices it t t q from period t forward while all other firms charge prices p , it retains all of its initial customers with q satisfying equation (6).
jt Equation (6) decreasing as a function of q . Once period t+1 arrives, however, the firm t+1 has an incentive to charge a higher price q than originally promised.
t+1
This problem is resolved here, as in Bils (1989) , by focusing on timeconsistent equilibria in which firms choose their prices sequentially, period-by-period. Thus, when choosing its optimal price q during period t, t t+1 the representative firm takes q as given, to be determined by decisions made in the future. Hence, the firm also takes t+1 t+1 Equation (9) indicates that here, as in Phelps and Winter (1970) and Bils (1989) , the firm faces a trade-off. By raising its current price q, the firm extracts more surplus from some of its customers. At the same time, however, this price increase drives away other customers; this effect works 0 not only to reduce current profits through the term h(q/p ;q ), but also to t t 0 reduce future profits through the term d(q/p ;q ) in (9). In a symmetric equilibrium, q=p , q =p , and x =x =1 for all Equation (7), meanwhile, reduces to 
Given the sequence {z } , equations (12)- (14) determine equilibrium values t t=0 0 for w , v'(1;z ), and q for all t>0. Given these solutions, all other t t t equilibrium quantities can be easily constructed. Hence, (12)- (14) completely summarize an equilibrium for this economy.
III. Countercyclical Markups
A. Steady State Markups
When z =z for all t>0, equations (12)- (14) Equation (15) is highly nonlinear; in general, analytic solutions fail to exist. However, two special cases for which explicit solutions can be found serve to highlight one of the model's key implications.
First, as k becomes arbitrarily large, (15) implies that the steady state markup of price over marginal cost, z/w, approaches two. In this case, infinite search costs give firms full monopoly power. Equation (4) shows that each household's elasticity of demand is e=2. Hence, the usual formula for the monopolistic markup applies: e/(e-1)=2.
Second, as k becomes arbitrarily small and as both q and q approach l h unity, (15) implies that z/w also approaches unity. In this case, households regard all goods as perfect substitutes and can move freely between firms.
Hence, the competitive outcome obtains: price equals marginal cost.
More generally, the steady state markup lies somewhere between the monopolistic and competitive solutions; as in Phelps and Winter (1970) , the representative firm enjoys only limited monopoly power over its customers.
And while analytic solutions to (15) When z increases to z =(1.01) , the steady state markup declines to 3.58 percent. Aggregate output, which by (4)- (7) from z =1 to z =(1.01) generates an increase in output of only one percent.
Here, as in Bils (1989) , the countercyclical markup works to amplify the effects of aggregate real disturbances on output.
B. The Response of Markups to Transitory Shocks
Comparing steady states, as above, illustrates the effects of a permanent change in the marginal product of labor. Next, consider the effects 8 of a purely transitory shock, as captured by the sequence {z } with t t=0 1 1/2 0 z =z =(1.01) and z =z =1 for all t>1.
t
Using the same parameter values as before, equations (12)- (14) yield the solutions z /w =1.0169 and z /w =1.0366 for all t>1. Thus, the transitory 0 0 t t shock causes the equilibrium markup to fall from 3.66 percent to 1.69 percent.
Output, meanwhile, increases by 4.94 percent during the period of the shock.
Once again, the markup is countercyclical, serving to amplify the effects of the technology shock.
C. The Sources of Countercyclical Markups
To understand how customer flow dynamics give rise to countercyclical markups in this environment, note first that equations (6), (7), and (14) imply that in a symmetric equilibrium, household j remains with its initial supplier during period t if and only if
For a household with q <1, the right-hand side of (16) (4) and (5), the size of the t household's purchase also increases with w . The left-hand side of (16) t measures the utility cost of searching for a new supplier; this cost is fixed relative to the size of the purchase. Hence, (16) implies that as the size its purchase increases, the household's incentive to search becomes stronger.
Next, consider equations (6) and (7) (17) f(q ) + q f'(q ).
Note from equation (14) that q is increasing in w . Since (14) also implies t t 0 that q <1, the assumption f'(q)>0 for all q<1 guarantees that the expression t in (17) is positive.
Thus, when the assumption f'(q)>0 for all q<1 holds, equation (17) implies that the strengthened incentive for any individual household to search translates into an increase in the number of households that actually search when the firm raises its price above p . In this case, the increase in w where the maximization is again by choice of c , n , c , and n and se{0,1}
satisfying (2) and (3).
The first order conditions for (18) indicate that optimal choices for 0 0 1 1 c , n , c , and n continue to be given by (4) and (5). Thus, if household j remained with its initial supplier during period t-1, so that s =0, (18) 
Since k>0, equations (19)- (22) show that the reduction in search costs makes the representative household more likely to search for a new supplier during period t if searched during period t-1. 
it t t t it t t t t t t t during period t.
The firm then begins period t+1 with a new set of initial customers of
As before, the firm chooses q to maximize its current market value, t given by the discounted sum in equation (8). The firm's Bellman equation 
t t t t t t t t t t t
Equations (20) and (22) 
p /w = w (1-w /z )h(1;s ,q ,q ).
t t t t t t t t
Using (4), (5), and (19), (21), and (28), equation (18) 
Finally, (19) and (21) combine to give the law of motion for s :
where s , the fraction of households with s =1, is an initial condition.
The seven equations, (24)- (27) and (29)- (31) equilibrium. As before, analytic solutions to this system are not generally available, but equilibria can be found numerically. 
V. The Persistent Effects of Monetary Shocks
The models described in sections II-IV are purely real; they cannot be used to study the effects of monetary shocks. In principal, the nominal sector could be accounted for here by adding a cash-in-advance constraint to the representative household's optimization problem; this, however, is not a straightforward exercise. Since households face idiosyncratic shocks, they will accumulate real balances not only for the purpose of buying consumption goods, as required by the cash-in-advance constraint, but also in an attempt to insure against adverse q shocks. Hence, as in Lucas (1980) , the monetary jt equilibrium will feature a nondegenerate distribution of real balances across households; constructing such an equilibrium will involve the difficult task of characterizing this distribution. Moreover, the cash-in-advance constraint will introduce a second intertemporal consideration, in addition to the search decision, into the household's already complicated problem.
Thus, in order to preserve tractability, let aggregate real money demand be described by the simple quantity equation The one percent increase in money generates a one percent increase in output when nominal prices are sticky for one period. This increase in output also increases the number of searching households during period t=0, which increases the number of households with low search costs during period t=1.
Hence, customer flow dynamics allow the effects of the monetary shock to persist. Output remains 0.31 percent above its steady state level during period t=1, 0.13 percent above steady state during period t=2, and 0.05 percent above steady state during period t=3.
VI. Conclusion
The results of sections IV and V illustrate that customer flow dynamics of the kind first considered by Phelps and Winter (1970) not only can serve to amplify the effects of shocks on aggregate output, as they do in Bils (1989) , but can also work to propagate those effects over time.
The model of customer flows developed here, while extending those of Phelps and Winter and Bils, remains highly stylized along some dimensions: preferences and technologies are described by simple functional forms, while capital accumulation is abstracted from entirely. These features of the model keep the analysis tractable and serve to isolate the effects of customer flows from other sources of propagation. On the other hand, they also preclude any assessment of the model's ability to match the US data. Accordingly, this paper must be read as one that simply illustrates the theoretical possibility that customer flow dynamics can work as a mechanism for generating persistent effects of real and monetary shocks. Whether this mechanism can produce effects that are quantitatively important remains a task for future research.
Notes
1 Cogley and Nason (1995) suggest that this criticism applies to real business cycle models as well; they argue that those models have only weak internal mechanisms for propagating the effects of technology shocks and therefore cannot account for the observed serial correlation in aggregate output.
2 Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) find evidence of countercyclical markups in the US data.
3
One might guess that the more basic assumption that q is iid across jt households, together with the law of large numbers, would guarantee that the individual household's probability F(q) of drawing q <q coincides with the jt fraction of the firm's total customers having q <q. As shown by Judd (1985) jt and Feldman and Gilles (1985) , however, the law of large numbers will not generally apply when there is a continuum of households. Feldman and Gilles indicate that probabilities for the individual household and fractions for the firm can be made to coincide by allowing q to be correlated across jt households; in fact, the analysis that follows is not inconsistent with any required cross-sectional dependence in q . jt 4 Again, the cross-sectional distribution of q is assumed to be such that the jt fraction of all households who remain with their initial suppliers during period t-1 and experience shock q <q during period t is equal to (1-s )F(q).
jt t
Similarly, the fraction of all households who search during period t-1 and experience shock q <q during period t is assumed to be s F(q). jt t
